A report issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on June 24, 2025, detailed safety problems at Boeing and oversight shortcomings by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the January 5, 2024, Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX event. This incident involved a mid-exit door failure at 15,000 feet, indicating production process flaws and regulatory control, resulting in concerns regarding the safety of one of the most used planes.
The Alaska Airlines Incident
On January 5, 2024, Alaska Airlines Flight 282 faced an issue shortly after departure. A section of the MED door came off at 4,500 meters, which depressurized the aircraft. Personal items fell, oxygen masks were needed, and a flight attendant sustained an injury from the cockpit door. While the 164 passengers and five crew members landed safely, it was identified that this was due to unsecured bolts, and could have led to significantly worse event.
This 737 MAX aircraft, only three months old, had bolts removed by unapproved staff during installation, not documented or inspected. Subsequently, each time it flew, the door was unstable. Already infamous for the 2018 Lion Air and 2019 Ethiopian Airlines crashes (fatalities numbered 346), this instance began more questions about the 737 MAX.
NTSB Findings: Boeing’s Systemic Safety Issues
The NTSB report specified “Boeing’s lack of adequate training, guidance, and oversight for factory workers” as a main cause. “Recurring non-compliance issues” in parts removal were pointed out; Boeing’s SMS, meant to mitigate hazards, was noted to be ineffective dating back to 2022. Designed for informed risk decisions, the SMS didn’t address hazards, a fault for a significant manufacturer like Boeing.
Whistleblowers, notably Shawn Pruchnicki (who spoke to the U.S. Senate Select Committee in April 2024), suggested the cause was profit-focused. Cost-cutting, such as sensor reduction in the 737 MAX’s MCAS system to compete with Airbus, caused other accidents. Stepped-up production – from one plane per day to 38 per month – put more pressure on quality, as part checks suffered due to less inspection time.
FAA’s Oversight Shortcomings
According to the NTSB, the FAA did not ensure Boeing addressed the safety issues, as the FAA didn’t effectively monitor Boeing’s SMS or enforce rules on part removals. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said missing bolts was preventable: “The safety issues causing the accident should have been obvious to Boeing and the FAA.” Over-reliance on Boeing and reduced monitoring let problems remain, shown after the 2018 and 2019 crashes when Boeing bypassed certification for autopilot systems.
Broader Implications and Recommendations
Following this, other airlines did inspections of the 737 MAX, with United Airlines finding some planes had parts that weren’t tightened. Training for oxygen mask use was also labeled by the NTSB as poor. Recommendations for training, oversight, and SMS implementation were provided to Boeing and the FAA to prevent manufacturing problems.
The key point is that the causes of the Alaska Airlines occurrence could also cause other accidents if neglected. It was warned that poor oversight and the speed of production continue to risk safety.
A Call for Accountability
The NTSB’s conclusions really spotlight Boeing’s apparent lean toward profit at the expense of safety, a situation only made worse by the FAA’s leniency, really. With increased attention now on the aviation sector, there is a strong push to put in place systematic changes to regain trust in the 737 MAX, and, above all, make sure passengers are safe. Currently, this event powerfully demonstrates that easily avoided mistakes can lead to disastrous results. Therefore, both Boeing and the FAA should move quickly to handle these important deficiencies; that much is obvious.